Kazakhstan has proposed a new Constitution, which marks a decisive moment in the country’s political evolution. Rather than redistributing power between branches or experimenting with a new regime type, the reforms aim at something more technical but arguably more consequential: clarifying how power is exercised, coordinated, and transferred within a presidential system. The underlying logic is reducing ambiguity, codifying informal practices, and narrowing the scope for ad hoc decision-making.
Taken together, the proposed changes suggest a conscious shift away from personalised governance toward a more rules-based presidential model. This is most evident in three areas: the restructuring of Parliament, the introduction of a Vice Presidency, and the explicit constitutionalisation of succession and appointment procedures.
The move to a unicameral parliament, to be known as the Kurultai, is emblematic of this approach. Kazakhstan’s current bicameral system has sometimes been criticised for its complexity and limited legislative efficiency. The proposed Kurultai would consist of 145 members (deputies) elected exclusively through proportional representation for five-year terms. Committee numbers would be capped, leadership streamlined, and the legislative process reduced to three clear stages: conceptual approval, amendment approval, and final adoption.
The reform strengthens the institutional role of political parties while keeping the executive firmly presidential. The logic appears to be that a smaller, more professional legislature – elected on a party basis – can provide more consistent scrutiny and policy input than a larger body with overlapping mandates. Proportional representation, in this context, is about accountability: parties cannot disown legislative outcomes if all deputies are elected under their banners.
Crucially, Parliament’s role is also expanded in appointments. Under the proposed Constitution, the appointment of members of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Audit Chamber, and the Central Election Commission would require parliamentary consent. Parliament would also elect all judges of the Supreme Court, following presidential nomination. These changes introduce clearer horizontal checks, anchoring key institutions in a shared constitutional process rather than executive discretion.
The proposed introduction of the office of Vice President fits squarely within this same logic. The Vice President would be appointed by the President with the consent of Parliament and would carry constitutionally defined responsibilities. These include representing Kazakhstan internationally, engaging with Parliament, working with domestic and foreign organisations, and performing duties assigned by the President.
What is notable here is the decision to constitutionalise a role that in many systems remains informal or politically fluid. By embedding the Vice Presidency in the Constitution, the reform provides legal clarity around delegation, representation, and continuity. The President has explicitly stated that the purpose is to strengthen governance coherence.
Perhaps the most consequential element of the reform, however, lies in the area of presidential succession. The draft Constitution establishes an unambiguous rule: in the event of early termination of presidential powers, elections must be held within two months. Any head of state must come to office exclusively through a popular vote. President Tokayev has described this principle as fundamental and non-negotiable.
This provision directly addresses a longstanding vulnerability in many post-Soviet systems, where unclear succession rules have created uncertainty, elite bargaining, or informal power transfers. By constitutionalising a short, mandatory electoral timetable, Kazakhstan is attempting to remove discretion from what is often the most destabilising moment in presidential systems. The aim is to ensure procedural certainty.
These reforms are presented by the authorities as a transition away from the 1995 constitutional model toward a fundamentally new political system. That claim deserves careful interpretation. The proposed Constitution does not abandon presidentialism, nor does it introduce parliamentary government. Instead, it seeks to update a framework that has accumulated layers of amendments over three decades, aligning formal rules more closely with how governance is expected to function in a more institutionally mature state.
The broader reconfiguration of advisory and administrative bodies reinforces this point. The creation of a new People’s Council separates consultative and societal dialogue from legislative authority. The People’s Council would have the right of legislative initiative and a mandate to promote interethnic and interfaith harmony, develop domestic policy proposals, and organise major humanitarian forums. At the same time, certain administrative structures supporting the current Parliament would be abolished, the post of State Counsellor eliminated, and the Presidential Administration adjusted to better reflect practical governance needs.
These changes of institutions suggest an effort to reduce overlap and informal power centres, clarifying who does what and on what legal basis.
Equally important is the process through which these reforms have been developed. Following President Tokayev’s September 2025 Address to the Nation, a working group conducted a six-month review of parliamentary reform proposals, receiving more than 2,000 submissions from citizens via digital platforms. In January 2026, a Constitutional Commission of 130 members – representing regions, civil society, legal experts, media, and local authorities – was established. Its meetings were open and publicly broadcast, and its work resulted in proposed changes affecting 77 articles, or around 84 percent of the existing Constitution.
The final decision will be made through a nationwide referendum. This matters less as a democratic signal than as a legitimacy mechanism. By subjecting a comprehensive constitutional reset to a popular vote, the authorities are seeking to anchor the new rules in public consent.
Whether the new constitutional model delivers greater predictability and institutional discipline will depend on implementation. Rules on paper do not automatically translate into rules in practice. But the direction of reform is clear. By reducing ambiguity around succession, appointments, legislative authority, and executive coordination, the proposed Constitution points toward a more rules-based form of presidential governance – one that is more clearly bounded by law.
