If you’ve been following Virginia’s civil procedure fights, you’ve seen a slow-moving political pattern recur with remarkable accuracy. A bill is presented. A version of it is passed by the General Assembly. First Glenn Youngkin in 2024 and now Abigail Spanberger in 2026, the governor vetoes it, citing technical issues rather than philosophical objections. The reform is unsuccessful. Virginia is still one of just two states in the union whose courts do not allow class action lawsuits, along with Mississippi. It is time for the next session. The bill is returned. Somehow, the cycle keeps on. Spanberger’s veto of SB 229 and HB 449 earlier this month is the most recent development in a tale that has now lasted two administrations and doesn’t appear to be going away.
By federal standards, the bill’s content was minor. In a way somewhat similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the procedural framework governing class actions in federal court, it would have permitted Virginia state courts to certify class actions. In order to give courts and practitioners time to get ready for the new procedural reality, the planned effective date was January 1, 2027. Small-dollar consumer claims, which by their very nature can only be pursued collectively, were the types of cases most frequently mentioned as driving the reform. illegal fees. infractions of consumer protection laws. claims of predatory lending. circumstances where cumulative damages are substantial enough to matter yet individual recoveries are insufficient to support individual lawsuit.
The decision was carefully phrased in Spanberger’s veto message. She said that although she could not sign the bill as it was given to her, she does support the larger objective of establishing a class action mechanism in Virginia courts. During the 2026 session, the General Assembly rejected the amendments she had previously suggested, which included clauses pertaining to venue regulations and liability caps. She decided to veto rather than sign a law that lacked those protections. In certain respects, the procedural framing reveals more than the actual stance. Governors who are adamantly against class action reform typically state as much. When a governor vetoes with clear support for the underlying objective, they are typically indicating that the next attempt should be rewritten.
Speaking with those who keep up with Virginia’s civil procedure battles gives me the impression that the political coalition opposing class action reform is more complex than the headlines usually convey. Small business advocacy groups are the most visible opponents of the proposal, claiming that it will expose Virginia companies to expensive and unpredictable new litigation in locations where access to federal courts is currently the sole practicable venue for class claims.
Their worries are not irrational. Even when the underlying claims are weak, class action defense is costly, and small firms in particular prefer to settle weak cases rather than pursue them all the way to rejection. firms of all sizes would actually bear the expense of altering the procedural landscape, and the per-case impact likely to be greater for smaller firms.
For almost ten years, the plaintiffs’ bar has been moving in the opposite way. They make a structural argument. The claim is that customers in Virginia do not now have practical access to the legal tools available to citizens of all other states, with the exception of Mississippi, for enforcing consumer protection statutes. Practically speaking, there is no viable recourse for a Virginia customer who was charged a $5 illegal fee by a national corporation unless that corporation has sufficient federal presence to warrant federal court jurisdiction.
In the absence of a state class action mechanism, the conduct persists, the corporation is not subject to enforcement pressure, and the harm is not compensated. According to this interpretation, the current structure does not stop baseless lawsuits. It keeps meritorious lawsuits from including little individual damages that are dispersed among numerous parties.
A version of the measure that specifically addresses Spanberger’s concerns on venue regulations and liability caps may be produced during the upcoming legislative session. In essence, the governor has given a road map in her veto message. The leadership of the General Assembly has admitted that some procedural issues require more clarification. The plaintiffs’ bar has stated that they are open to negotiating certain clauses. Although the business community is still against it in theory, carefully crafted class size restrictions, fee-shifting clauses, and venue regulations that forbid forum shopping could all help allay the particular worries about cost and unpredictability. There are the components of a feasible compromise. So yet, there hasn’t been the political will to bring them together.
Another possibility is that the cycle just keeps going. It appears that the issue is more difficult to settle than its supporters realize, as seen by two successive gubernatorial vetoes—one Republican and one Democratic. With significant ramifications for corporate operations, consumer protection, and judicial administration, class action procedure is a really complex field of civil litigation. To create legislation that appeases all pertinent constituencies, a substantial amount of writing labor is needed. To be honest, the political payoff for doing it correctly is quite small. The majority of voters in Virginia are unaware of whether their state courts allow class actions, and the majority won’t be aware of any changes to the procedural procedures.
The state has updated its civil procedure structure in numerous other areas. Reforms pertaining to consumer protection have received support from the Spanberger government in various areas. Virginia customers have fewer effective legal remedies in this particular area than citizens of almost every other state since the class action issue continues coming up on the legislative agenda and is never resolved.
