Labour mobility reform remains one of the most powerful and least politically fashionable tools available to policymakers who want to improve the lives of working people, yet governments continue to erect and maintain barriers that trap millions in poverty. On both the international and domestic fronts, the costs of restricted movement are measurable, the beneficiaries of reform are clear, and the political will remains the missing ingredient.
The Case for Labour Mobility Reform
Economists estimate that eliminating legal barriers to migration globally would roughly double world GDP. At the individual level, a worker who moves from a country with weak economic institutions to a freer one can expect to double or triple their income almost immediately, before accounting for the compounding benefits of improved access to training and education.
The gains are not confined to migrants. Receiving countries benefit from lower-cost goods, expanded innovation, and new business formation, which immigrants generate at higher rates than native-born populations. Migrant contributions to scientific and medical research have produced treatments that have saved millions of lives worldwide.
Against that backdrop, the Trump Administration’s restrictions on immigration represent a substantial withdrawal from those potential gains, condemning hundreds of thousands of people to poverty and denying receiving economies the growth that follows from openness.
Tariffs, Zoning, and Licensing: Where Mobility Is Blocked Domestically
The same logic that applies to the movement of people applies to the movement of goods. On 20 February 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled 6-3 in Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorise the President to impose tariffs. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, concluded that IEEPA’s grant of authority to ‘regulate importation’ cannot bear the weight of an asserted presidential power to impose tariffs ‘on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate, for any amount of time,’ and that ‘IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.’
The ruling consolidated challenges to both the IEEPA ‘Trafficking Tariffs’ on Canada, Mexico, and China and the IEEPA ‘Reciprocal Tariffs’ on nearly all US trading partners, according to WilmerHale. All tariffs imposed under IEEPA terminated at midnight Eastern time on 24 February 2026, four days after the ruling, per White & Case.
The fiscal scale of what was struck down is considerable, though the precise figure is disputed. The Tax Foundation estimates the now-unlawful IEEPA tariffs had raised more than $160 billion through the date of the ruling, with a projected $1.4 trillion over the decade from 2026 to 2035. SCOTUSblog places the figure for refundable tariffs at more than $200 billion, and the court did not rule on whether importers are entitled to refunds. In dissent, Justice Brett Kavanaugh warned the government ‘may be required to refund billions of dollars to importers who paid the IEEPA tariffs, even though some importers may have already passed on costs to consumers or others.’
The administration has since sought replacement tariffs under alternative statutory pretexts. Litigation on those measures continues.
Within the United States, exclusionary zoning prevents millions of workers, particularly those on lower incomes, from relocating to regions with stronger labour markets. Progress is occurring, if unevenly. The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis documented that more than 30 housing bills became law in California alone in 2024, while Florida and Washington made substantial changes to their land-use regimes in 2023. On 11 July 2026, the bipartisan 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act became federal law, combining elements of the House-passed Housing for the 21st Century Act and the Senate’s ROAD to Housing Act, according to the Bipartisan Policy Center.
Occupational licensing presents a parallel constraint on interstate mobility. Arizona enacted universal occupational licence recognition in 2019 under HB 2569, and 20 states have since adopted similar laws, according to the Institute for Justice. Separately, the National Conference of State Legislatures reports that since January 2017, 42 states have enacted at least one occupational licensure compact bill, with 28 states enacting three or more and 137 separate compact bills enacted across the country.
Unlike redistributive labour policies, which shift income between groups without expanding the overall pie, removing mobility barriers is a positive-sum reform. Workers gain access to better jobs. Employers gain access to a wider pool of talent. Consumers benefit from lower prices and greater innovation. The principal opponents are those whose political interests depend on restricting who may live or work where.
The next test will be whether the replacement tariff regimes survive the courts, and whether the momentum in state housing and licensing reform translates into measurable wage gains for the workers the policies are meant to reach.
