On any given weekday, stand at the intersection of Haro and Thurlow in downtown Vancouver to witness the physical manifestation of a failed real estate wager: a lot that is significantly less valuable than the debt perched on top of it, surrounded by the routine activity of a city that continued to move while the investment behind it quietly fell apart. A group of investors, supported by Bank of Montreal, paid $173 million for that site in 2018 when interest rates were low and the condo market seemed to be headed in a single direction. They intended to construct a 516-unit tower there. The owners ceased paying interest by July 2023. BMO put the project under receivership by January 2024. The property was valued at $98 million by the city.
The main narrative of Vancouver real estate in 2024 and 2025 is this disparity between what was borrowed, what was constructed, and what the asset is now worth. It will play out across dozens of developments concurrently, attracting attention from banks, courts, and federal regulators in ways that would have seemed improbable only a few years ago. According to local real estate reporting, stalled or failing Vancouver projects have resulted in losses of about $300 million, with half-built towers among the impacted assets. The assumption of permanent appreciation, which underpinned the boom’s heavy borrowing, is being put to the test in court cases throughout British Columbia.
| Detail | Information |
|---|---|
| Federal investigation | Competition Bureau court order (Feb 20, 2026) against Greater Vancouver REALTORS® — investigating commission “steering,” price-fixing, and anti-competitive MLS practices |
| What is “steering”? | A practice where agents are allegedly motivated to show buyers homes offering higher commissions, restricting genuine market choice and inflating costs for both buyers and sellers |
| Regulator involved | Canada’s Competition Bureau (independent federal body) · investigation began 2024 targeting CREA; expanded Feb 2026 to include GVR specifically |
| BMO case study | 2018: BMO backed investors paying $173M for Haro & Thurlow Vancouver site · planned 516-unit tower stalled at city council · owners stopped interest payments July 2023 · receivership January 2024 |
| Competing creditors | Seven creditors including lenders based in China · property city-assessed at $98M · rival bid of $93M from Chard Development rejected by former owners |
| Banking regulator view | OSFI head Peter Routledge (Feb 2024): commercial real estate losses are “manageable” for Canada’s major banks — “not without loss, just everything’s relative” |
| Money laundering concern | Real estate used for laundering in Canada has drawn increasing scrutiny from regulators and law enforcement — particularly in BC’s Lower Mainland market (Canadian Financial Crime Academy, Aug 2025) |
| BC regulatory context | BC Financial Services Authority (BCFSA) became single real estate regulator for BC in 2021, consolidating oversight of agents, developers, and strata managers |
The reason the Haro and Thurlow case is instructive is that it shows more than just overvaluation. Seven creditors, including Chinese lenders, were involved, and they all came to different conclusions about the best course of action. This resulted in a complex web of conflicting claims that needed to be sorted through by Deloitte’s receivership team and several court appearances. Ranked higher than other creditors, BMO’s position seems likely to be fully reimbursed from any potential sale. However, the math is more difficult for the creditors listed below. The previous owners rejected Chard Development’s $93 million bid for the property last year. That choice, which was made when the project was still in the process of recovering, is one of those that only becomes clear in hindsight.
In February 2024, Peter Routledge, Canada’s bank regulator, told reporters in Toronto that commercial real estate losses are still manageable for the nation’s largest banks. He stated, “not without loss, just everything’s relative,” in a candor that, depending on your threshold for ambiguity, could be either comforting or slightly concerning. In all but the worst cases, losses on real estate lending portfolios will remain within ranges that the banks can absorb, according to analysts who largely concur with his assessment. At the portfolio level, that might be the case. It is much messier at the project level.
The regulatory aspect, which is unrelated to bank exposure, comes next. As part of a growing investigation into commission regulations and possible anti-competitive practices on MLS systems, Canada’s Competition Bureau secured a federal court order against Greater Vancouver REALTORS®, the group that represents over 15,000 real estate professionals throughout the Lower Mainland, in February 2026.
The Bureau is investigating whether commission structures deter buyers’ agents from engaging in price competition, whether “steering”—pointing buyers in the direction of listings that offer higher agent commissions—distorts buying decisions, and whether the current regulations are driving up transaction costs for both parties. The Canadian Real Estate Association was the initial focus of the 2024 investigation, which has since broadened to include GVR’s enforcement of these regulations in Greater Vancouver. There has been no finding of misconduct. However, the willingness of a federal court to order the production of records indicates that the Bureau found sufficient preliminary evidence to proceed.
It’s difficult to ignore how these two threads—the commission investigation and the developer debt crisis—point to the same fundamental question: how much of Vancouver’s real estate market has been based on structures that benefited insiders more than buyers? For years, the city’s real estate industry has been plagued by money laundering issues, which have drawn regulatory attention. Part of the reason for the 2021 consolidation of BC’s real estate oversight under the BC Financial Services Authority was worries that disparate regulations allowed bad practices to continue in various market segments.
Observing all of this happen at once gives the impression that, whether it wants to or not, Vancouver’s real estate market is about to enter a period of increased regulation. Although the era of cheap debt, stacked syndicate structures, and commission opacity may not be completely over, it is currently being investigated simultaneously from multiple angles by organizations with significant authority. There is still genuine uncertainty about what they discover and what comes next. Receivership files continue to pile up. The court orders do the same.
